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COMMENTS

THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE V. EXISTING
LAW AS TO THE BUYER'S RIGHTS ON
IMPROPER DELIVERY OF GOODS
I.

INTRODUCTION

The proposed Uniform Commercial Code is the subject of some
discussion among lawyers and businessmen in many walks of life.
The Uniform Commercial Code is certainly one of the most ambitious
attempts at a uniform law ever made, in that it is an attempt to codify
an entire field of law into one uniform act, in this instance premised
on the concept that all commercial transactions relate to a single
field of law.' Because of the scope of the proposed code, it appears
that a comparison of some of the provisions of the proposed code with
existing law is in order, and an evaluation attempted where a comparison is made. The Uniform Commercial Code is an attempt at simplification and clarification of the law relating to commercial transactions generally.2
Therefore, it seems appropriate to examine various phases of the
commercial law in the light of what our law now is and what the Uniform Commercial Code proposes. One of the phases of the law of
sales, involving some changes in present law, has to do with the rights
of the buyer when goods shipped to him by the seller do not comply
with the contract.3
II.

THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL

Section 2-601

of the Uniform

CODE-ITs TERMINOLOGY

Commercial

Code provides

as

follows:
".. . if the goods or the tender of delivery fail in any respect
to conform to the contract, the buyer may
(a) reject the whole; or
(b) accept the whole; or
(c) accept any commercial unit or units
and reject the rest."
This section effects a change in the present law in that it allows
a partial acceptance of a non-conforming tender in good faith without
the loss of any of the buyer's remedies. 4 It would also permit the
acceptance of all or part of the goods even though they did not con-

'Bunn, Charles, "Uniform Commercial Code-Some General Observations,"
1952 Wis. L. RLv. 197.
2The drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code are the members of the
American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, with their respective advisers.
See also, supra, note 1.
'

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODF, OFFICIAL DRAi.-r, TEXT AND COMMENTS EDITION,

1952, p.186.
4 Ibid.
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form with the contract at all, requiring only that there be good faith
on the part of the buyer and that any acceptance be commercially
reasonable. 5 Just who is to determine what is commercially reasonable
in such a situation is not indicated, but it appears that, the only solution would be a judicial determination of the commercial reasonableness of the buyer's acts where the parties could not agree between
themselves. True enough, the commercial custom could be used as a
basic determining factor, but commercial custom varies from locale to
locale. Another problem here involved has to do with the value to be
given to non-conforming goods when the buyer decides to accept them..
Is the contract price to apply? How can it when the goods are not in
conformity with the contract? Who is to determine what price to apply to the situation?
It should also be noted here that there is a new term-new to the
law-used in section 2-601 of the Code. That term is "commercial
unit." It is also well to note, at this point, that whole sections of the
Code are devoted solely to defining terms. Experience has shown that
this is both practical and useful. The Uniform Commercial Code, Sec.
2-105 defines a "commercial unit" as:
"... such a unit of goods as by commercial usage is a single
whole for purposes of sale and division of which materially
impairs its character or value on the market or in use. A commercial unit may be a single article (as a machine) or a set of
articles (such as a suite of furniture or an assortment of sizes)
or a quantity (as a bale, gross, or carload) or any other unit
treated in use or in the relevant market as a single whole."
The introduction of this term appears merely to be the introduction into law of a term used by those whom the law directly affects,
and gives the term the definition and meaning it has among those to
whom the law is meant to apply and who most use the term. This
situation should surely simplify any problems that arise in relation to
the term and should, in fact, prevent a number of definition problems
from arising.
Another point, concerning the introduction of this concept of the
commercial unit, has to do with the effect on other non-conforming
goods shipped to a buyer, where the buyer accepts one or a few of the
non-conforming units and rejects the remainder of the goods. The
comment of the drafters indicates that a buyer will not be permitted to
accept a commercial unit or units out of a shipment where such acceptance would materially impair the value of the remaining goods.6 Just
what would constitute a "material impairment" of the value of the remaining goods in such a situation? Should not a buyer be given con5

Supra, note 4.
6 Supra, note 4.
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siderable leeway where the seller has seit non-conforming goods? Certainly, in times of shortages of certain goods, when a buyer is expected
to take a certain amount of some other goods in order to get a quota. of
an item in short supply, the acceptance of the item in short supply.
and rejection of the rest of the goods where none of the goods
shipped comply to the contract, could lead to numerous problems. This
is true even though the buyer has complied strictly with the letter of
7
the wording of the Code.
In order to attempt a solution of some of the problems involved
herein, it appears proper to examine part of the existing law on this
subject generally, and to make a comparison of the existing law with
the above sections of the proposed Code.

III. EXISTING LAW AND UNIFORM ENACTMENTS AS COMPARED
WITH THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

The only previous uniform law on the subject consists of several
portions of the Uniform Sales Act." However, before the enactment
of the Uniform Sales Act by any of the states, there appears to have
been consideable confusion as to the effect of the acceptance of nonconforming goods." Strictly speaking, many of the decisions on this
subject involve situations where there was a defect in the goods when
delivered. 0 In such a situation, the New York rule, before the passage
of the Uniform Sales Act, was that in the case of a present sale of
goods, acceptance of non-conforming goods did not bar the buyer's
right to an action for breach of warranty where there were express
warranties."' That there was an extension of this rule to include express warranties in contracts to sell should be noted.' 2 However, where
there were no express warranties, acceptance of non-conforming goods
by the buyer barred his rights to sue for breach of implied warranties. 3
Since the passage of the Uniform Sales Act, which is now in effect
in most of the forty-eight states,' 4 the buyer's remedies for breach
7Itis also well to note at this point that much of the meaning to be given the
various sections of the proposed code are derived from the comments of the
drafters. The sections of the code, in and of themselves, sometimes do not
clearly indicate what the drafters' comments show was intended to be included
in the code itself. The 1952 Text and Comments Edition of the Uniform
Commercial Code includes the entire code plus the comments of the drafters,
8 edited by Charles Bunn of the University of Wisconsin.
WIs. STATS., Ch. 121 (1951).
9
WILLISTON ON SALES, §488 and 489 (2 ed., 1924), and cases there cited.
See also, VOLD ON SALES, §138 (1931).
0
2 VOLD ON SALES, ppA32-433.

"Reed v. Randall, 29 N.Y. 358 (1864); McCormick v. Sarson, 45 N.Y. 265
(1871) ; Foot v. Bently, 44 N.Y. 166 (1870) ; Staiger v. Soht, 116 App.Div. 874,
102 N.Y.S. 342 (1907).
12 Day v. Pool, 52 N.Y. 416, 11 Am.Rep. 719 (1873).
'13 Gaylord Mfg. Co. v. Allen, 53 N.Y. 515 (1873).
'4 1 U.L.A. '52 pp., page 6.
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of warranty, either express or implied, survive acceptance of the goods
so long as notice of any defect or lack of conformity with the contract
is given to the seller within a reasonable time. 15 Therefore, it appears that under the Uniform Sales Act a buyer could accept a nonconforming tender and still sue for breach of warranty in most cases."
Acceptance of a non-conforming tender, with knowledge on the part
of the buyer, waives the right of the buyer to rescind under the Act'I
but the buyer may sue for breach of warranty without requesting the
seller to make good on his breach.' It should also be noted that, under
the Uniform Sales Act, a buyer may waive his right to rescind the
contract by acceptance of an incomplete delivery and a continued use
of the goods so accepted.' It appears that where the buyer does waive
his right to rescind in the manner last stated, he may still have an
abatement of the purchase price. 20 All that the Act requires is that the
buyer give notice of the defects in the goods within a reasonable time
in order to be able to maintain an action for breach of warranty or
to have the court abate the purchase price when the seller sues for his
sales price.22
Now, it is apparent from the authorities that, under the Uniform
Sales Act, a buyer may accept non-conforming goods either by expressly so doing or by performing an act inconsistent with the idea
of recission, such as using the goods knowing that they do not conform to the contract.2 2 However, from the language of Section 44
of the Uniform Sales Act, it seems highly improbable that a buyer
could so accept part of a shipment which is entirely non-conforming
without accepting the whole shipment. This is possible under the Uniform Commercial Code.
The next problem then is, what did the buyer have to do to effect
a recission before and under the Uniform Sales Act? Authority indicates that, both before and since the Act, it is necessary for the buyer
to unconditionally offer to return the goods before there can be an effective recission. 23 It also appears that under the Uniform Sales Act.
15 UNr0RM SALEs Acr, §§48 and 69 (1) ; See also, VOLD ON SALES, p.432 (1931).
11Henderson Tire & Rubber Co. v. P. K. Wilson & Co., 235 N.Y. 489, 139 N.E.
583 (1923) ; Bass v. Bellofatto, 96 N.J.Law 320, 115 A. 302 (1921) ; UNIFORt
SALES A-r, §49; See also, VOLD ON SALES, p.433 (1931).
17 Banninger v. Landfield, 209 Wis. 327, 245 N.W. 113 (1932).
'sDunck Tank Works, Inc. v. Sutherland, 236 Wis. 83, 294 N.W. 510 (1940).
That this concept was accepted prior to the Uniform Sales Act is evident.
Butler v. Titus, 13 Wis. 479 (1861).

'9 Supra, note 17.
20 Supra, note 17.
21 For what may or may not be a reasonable time for giving notice of defects,
see: Knobel v. J. Bartel Co., 176 Wis. 393, 187 N.W. 188 (1922); Svoboda v.
Barta, 169 Wis. 338, 172 N.W. 719 (1919); Aaron Bodek & Son v. Avrach,
297 Pa. 225, 146 A. 546 (1929).
22 Supra, note 17.
21 Dunck Tank Works, Inc. v. Sutherland, 236 Wis. 83, 294 N.W. 510 (1940);
Mallow v. Hall, 209 Wis. 429, 245 N.W. 90 (1932); J. L. Owens Co. v.
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Section 44, if any part of the contract was not fulfilled by the delivery
of goods proper to all parts of the contract by the seller, the buyer
could reject the entire shipment.24 The Wisconsin Supreme Court has
indicated that this rule would be applicable even without the Uniform

Sales Act. 25 Of course Section 44 of the Uniform Sales Act specifically allows the buyer, in the case last indicated, to accept that portion
of the goods that conforms to the contract by paying contract price
for the conforming goods accepted and to reject the non-conforming
goods. Under Section 2-601 of the Uniform Commercial Code, this
requirement for partial acceptance is done away with.
In addition, Section 2-601 of the Uniform Commercial Code seems
to indicate, from its terminology and from the comment of the drafters, that the buyer has all of the rights assured him both before the
Uniform Sales Act and under Sections 44 and 69 of said Act. Also,
there seems to be the notable addition to the buyer's rights under the
new code, in that it allows the acceptance of the previously mentioned
"commercial unit" whether or not it conforms in any way to the contract, and whether or not the seller intended the delivery to be complete
or partial. This appears to put the buyer in a position of being able to
accept some portion of a shipment of goods which he sorely needs,
even if they do not conform, strictly to the contract, without his act
being construed in law to have been an acceptance of the entire shipment. This last mentioned result is a carry-over of the old common law
rule which was described even before the advent of the Uniform Sales
Act.20 In most other instances of rejection or acceptance of non-conforming goods, the buyer's rights appear not to be changed much by
these sections of the proposed code.
IV. CoNcLusioNs
The only real changes that appear to have been effectuated in the
law as to the buyer's rights on improper delivery by the Uniform
Commercial Code are: (1) the introduction of the new term "commercial unit" to the law; and (2) the right given to the buyer to accept a commercial unit or units, apparently whether or not the goods
contained therein conform to the contract in any way, and to reject
the rest of the goods if they do not conform to the contract. The introduction of the new term into the law could well be in accord -with the
avowed purpose of the drafters of the code to aid in making the law
of the world of commerce clear. 27 It seems that there could be no
Whitcomb, 165 Wis. 92, 160 N.W. 161 (1917); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS,
§400 (1932).
24Washburn-Crosby Co. v. Kubiak, 175 Wis. 291, 185 N.W. 162 (1921); 46
Am. JUR., SALES, §211, 212 and cases there cited.
2SWashburn-Crosby Co. v. Kubiak, 175 Wis. 291, 185 N.W. 162 (1921).
28 Morse v. Moore, 83 Me. 473, 22 A. 362 (1891) ; See also, WLLISTON ON SALES,
7 Sec. 488 and 489.
2 Supra, note 1.
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better way of clarifying the law of the commercial world than by
using terminology in the law that is common to commerce and the
business world. In the event of adoption of the code, however, the
understanding of it would be well served by including the comments
of the drafters because, as above noted, the code itself is much clarified and explained by these comments.
HAROLD M. FRAUENDORFER
Marquette L.L.B., 1953
OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF AIRSPACE
The development of wide-spread air navigation has presented an
interesting problem to the legal world. Just who owns and controls the
airspace over this nation? Is it the subjacent landowner? If not, is it
then the property of the public? If'the property of the public, which
government, federal, state or local is supreme as to regulating the use
of this airspace?
Prior to the advent of aeronautics, the courts had relied on the
ancient maxim, "cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum et ad infernas," in determining the landowner's rights to the airspace above
his property.' Freely translated the maxim reads: "He who possesses
the land possesses also all that which is above and below." Now that
air travel is on a nationwide scale, four theories of airspace ownership have been advanced: (1) The ancient "ad coelum" maxim mentioned above which gives the landowner unrestricted ownership; (2)
There is no ownership at all of unenclosed airspace. This theory is the
extreme opposite of the first theory; (3) Landowner has unrestricted
ownership, but the airspace is subject to a "privilege" of aerial transit
at reasonable altitudes. This theory offers a compromise between the
extremes of the first two theories; (4)-There is unrestricted ownership up to a certain altitude, at which ownership ceases. This is the socalled "zone theory." The extent of the zone is designated by such
phrases as "lower stratum," "effective possession," or "actual or prospective user." 2
It is obvious that to apply the ad coelum maxim to the operation
of airplanes would be a serious barrier to the development of aviation. Each flight would be a trespass against the rights of the land'Bury v. Pope, 1 Cro. Elizabeth 118, 78 Eng. Rep. 375 (1586) was the first
reported case in which the maxim was quoted. Case held that where a
landowner erects a house so close to a window on the adjoining property
that the light is ct off therefrom, the injured landowner has no complaint
even though his building and his window were built forty years before the
second building was erected. Penruddock's case, 5 Coke's Rep. 100 (1597)
Baten's case, 9 Coke's Rep. 53, 77 Eng. Rep. 810 (1611).
2 Sweeney, Adjusting the Conflicting Interests of Lando'wner and Aviator in
Anglo-Am erican Law, 3 J.AIR L. 329 (1932).

